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Sports are used frequently as a window to examine society. Because of unique datasets, sports allow researchers to test human behavior, and in recent years, sportshave been used to show when discrimination, collusion, and cheating are likely
to occur. Cullen, Latessa, and Jonson (2012, this issue) use data on National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) infractions to investigate how often and why college athletes
break NCAA rules. Cullen et al. categorize these infractions as infractions while they were
being recruited by the university and infractions that were committed after they enrolled
in college. They find that whereas major NCAA infractions are rare, minor infractions
happen somewhat frequently. Their results provide valuable insights into the causes of rule
infractions, and the results may be useful in designing policies in a broader context.
The data used in the study enable the researchers to test the frequency as well as
possible causes of athlete infractions. Weak evidence exists in favor of a variety of existing
theories, but some consistent results are found. If athletes clearly can gain from committing
an infraction, if their friends are getting away with committing infractions, and if the moral
costs are perceived as being inconsequential, then athletes are more likely to break the rules.
In other words, if the benefits clearly outweigh the costs, then the main barrier that stops
infractions is the athlete’s own moral compass. Furthermore, many athletes do not feel a
moral obligation to follow all the rules, and some feel entitled to benefits that are prohibited.
Therefore, athletes in large revenue-generating sports, such as football and men’s basketball,
commit minor infractions regularly.
A somewhat unique aspect of NCAA rules is why they exist. Even the casual observer
of college sports knows that college sports have become big business and that revenues have
been increasing at a rapid rate over the past couple of decades. Yet, any financial benefits to
the athletes are restricted. The NCAA claims that their rules are in place to keep athletes
amateurs and that these rules are in the best interest of the athletes. However, as Humphreys
(2012, this issue) says, this seems peculiar because these rules prohibit monetary transfers
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from universities to athletes explicitly, and universities are the ones in charge of the NCAA.
I hope that no governing bodies are looking out for my best interest in the same manner as
the NCAA.
So naturally, many of the athletes feel a sense of entitlement. Consequently, it does not
take long for some college athletes to perceive themselves to be an integral part of a large and
growing business, where others receive nearly all the pecuniary rewards. As Piquero (2012,
this issue) notes, in other contexts, entitlement has proved to be important in understanding
determinants of crime. Clearly, if the student athletes feel entitled to a piece of the financial
pie, the moral cost of breaking the rules is mitigated.
This context creates an interesting dilemma. Many economists would argue that some
NCAA rules are unnecessary in terms of social welfare and serve only to benefit athletic
departments that behave like a cartel or monopsony at the expense of athletes. After all,
if universities cannot pay athletes, then they will pay the people or facilities that recruit
the athletes, thereby increasing the value of coaches and amenities. Obviously, some would
disagree with the economists’ assessment, but surely many of the athletes would favor the
economists’ view. Nonetheless, rules are rules. So although some observers might question
the objectives of the policy makers, surely the policy makers want compliance of the rules.
This research seems to indicate that athletes often are in violation of minor infractions and
rarely are caught for these minor infractions. Also, compliance is largely a function of the
athlete’s perceptions of the moral authority of the rules, which leads to some interesting
questions. How bad is it if athletes break rules that they, and many others, perceive as unfair?
Is it more effective to increase punishments or to increase surveillance? Or should we try to
convince people of the morality of the rules? Does this mean that rule makers should not
or cannot effectively create rules that are not consistent with people’s morals? Do rules that
are not easily enforced only punish those who are willing to follow the rules? Perhaps these
questions may be an interesting line of future research.
It seems that since the study’s survey was conducted, the NCAA has gradually loosened
up some of its restrictions, giving athletes a slightly bigger share of the pie. Maybe the
NCAA has eliminated some rules because many minor violations were occurring with a
high frequency anyway, and perhaps minor violations are a gateway to major violations.
On the other hand, the NCAA’s response could be the result of public pressure to treat
athletes better. As Humphreys (2012) notes, the NCAA has a sizeable financial incentive to
keep its monopsony intact; perhaps giving some small concessions is a way to preserve their
monopsony power.
But this loosening of policies is not what Cullen et al. (2012) suggest. They also are
skeptical of increasing punishments to increase compliance. Instead, they explicitly favor
intervention with at-risk athletes and athlete education of the rules. Of course, it is possible
that compliance with minor infractions is not the main objective of the NCAA, but whatever
the case, this study provides an interesting context to these NCAA rule changes.
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To what extent the results of Cullen et al. (2012) are generalizable to other segments
of society is unclear, although Piquero (2012) indicates that the results are more or less in
line with research in other contexts. Hopefully, future research will show us exactly how
unique college sports is as a context for breaking rules. Regardless, this study does give us
interesting insight into who breaks rules and why.
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